THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

A MONTHLY REVIEW

EDITED BY JAMES KNOWLES

VOL. XLV

JANUARY—JUNE 1899

NEW YORK

LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION CO., 231 BROADWAY

LONDON: SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, LIMITED
THE DREYFUS DRAMA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

I. ARREST, TRIAL, AND SENTENCE

On the 29th of October, 1894, the *Liére Parole*, edited by M. Edouard Drumont, the leader of anti-Semitism, asked if there had not been an important arrest for the crime of high treason. On the morrow the *Eclair* replied that the statement was true. On the 1st of November the *Liére Parole* published an article with the sensational title, 'Arrest of a Jewish Officer.' The *Petit Journal* and the *Intransigeant* accused the Minister of War of wishing to stifle the affair because 'the officer is a Jew.' On the 5th of November M. Drumont published an article from which we select the following passage: 'Look at this Ministry, which should be the sanctuary of patriotism, and which is a den, a place of perpetual scandals, a sewer to which one could not compare the Augean stables, for no Hercules has yet essayed to cleanse it.' The article finished by telling Deputies that 'to-morrow, without doubt, they will applaud the Minister of War when he comes to boast of the measures which he has taken to save Dreyfus.' On the same day, in the *Intransigeant*, Rochefort published an article commencing with these words:

A person named Mercier, a general by trade, and Minister of War in consequence of circumstances independent of his will, should, several days ago, have been taken by the scruff of his neck and thrown, with the utmost violence, down the stairs of his department, because, after having refused to order the arrest of the traitor Dreyfus, he only decided to do it under the menace of a scandal which the honest colleagues of the said Dreyfus were resolved to stir up.

These insults continued till the 7th of November. On this day General Mercier, the Minister of War, seeing that he had all to lose—save honour—in resisting, and that he had all to gain—save honour—in yielding, capitulated. On the next day a complete change came o'er the spirit of Rochefort's dream. For him, now, General Mercier became, with General de Boisdeffre, the patriot, the great man, who had made up his mind to 'go right through with it and have Dreyfus shot.' Those who would prevent the fulfilment of
this amiable resolve are 'his colleagues in the Ministry and the President of the Republic'—then M. Casimir Perier. As for General Mercier himself, he is a new Boulangé. Could praise go further?

General Mercier pledged himself in an interview published on the 28th of November by the Figaro. In that he said that 'he had had abhorrent proofs of the treason of Dreyfus, that he had submitted them to his colleagues in the Ministry, that the guilt of that officer was absolutely certain; and that he had civil accomplices.' Opinion was thus ground-baited by the organs in the press of the General Staff, the officers of which had piloted the whole affair. The Minister of War, after having resisted, put himself at their head. He, the head of the army, declared the accused guilty three weeks before he appeared before the court-martial.

The trial commenced on the 19th of December, before a court-martial presided over by Colonel Maurel. The examination of the accused was conducted in public. His name, he declared, was Alfred Dreyfus, aged thirty-five years, born at Mulhouse, commissioned as captain of artillery, detached as probationer at the First Bureau of the General Headquarters Staff. As soon as witnesses were called for the Government Commissioner demanded that the further proceedings should be conducted with closed doors. Maître Demange, the counsel for Dreyfus, wished to address to the court some considerations on this point: 'Seeing that the single document . . . '

The president of the court-martial brutally interrupted him with the remark, 'There are other interests in question than those of the prosecution and the defence.' Alas! that was easy to be seen. Maître Demange persisted. The president rose brusquely and commanded the court-martial to retire. After a quarter of an hour of deliberation the court returned and decided that the trial should be conducted in privacy; but the knowledge had been acquired that Dreyfus was condemned on a single document.

The summary method adopted by the president of the court-martial, the preceding campaigns of the Libre Parole and the Intransigeant, the patronage accorded by these journals to General Mercier, and his previous declarations, left little room for doubt in the minds of impartial people, who asked themselves if there had not been, in this case, other interests thought of than those of truth and justice. Maître Demange said, 'They have put a padlock on one's lips. In the eyes of the general public Dreyfus is guilty; but for my own part, in my own mind, I remain persuaded, in the most absolute manner, of his innocence.'

I was the only journalist to take exception—in the Siècle—to the manner in which the trial had been conducted, and to call attention to the obscenity with which the affair was surrounded.

On the 5th of January, 1895, the frightful ceremony of the degradation of Dreyfus took place. He protested his innocence with
an energy which the entire press put on record, however prepossessed against him. To the surging mob which howled, 'Death! Death to the traitor!' he repeated again and again, 'I swear that I am innocent.'

In violation of juridical principle the Government proposed and the Parliament accepted the law of the 2nd of February, 1895—a special law for a single individual, with regard to a crime supposed to have been committed at a previous date. In consequence of this law Dreyfus was not sent to New Caledonia, but was deported to the Devil's Island, under the murderous climate of Guiana, and was submitted to odious ill-treatment, in dereliction of the law of 1873 on transportation. Silence reigned, troubled only from time to time by the anti-Semitic journals, which, arguing from the case of Dreyfus, denounced the Jewish officers and demanded their expulsion from the army.

II. The Conspiracy Leaks Out

Nearly two years passed away, when, in consequence of a piece of false news published by an English paper, on the 3rd of September, 1896, those who had brought about the condemnation of Dreyfus, feeling within themselves that he had been wrongly condemned, manifested a strange desire to get him tried and condemned anew by the public and Parliament. This mental unrest on the part of the conspirators is very remarkable. On the 14th of September a journal inspired by Henry, then deputy chief of the Information Department of the General Staff—the Eclair—published an article entitled 'The Traitor.' In this it said:

The reasons which militated in favour of silence exist no longer. The difficulties which might arise from the disclosure of certain facts are removed. We are persuaded that, without fear of embarrassment or delicate complications, one may display in the light of day that which it was not possible to produce even on the day of the trial—the proof, the irrefutable proof, the full proof, the proof which decided the unanimous verdict of the officers composing the court-martial.

The Eclair then gave the following description of this proof: 'It was a letter in cipher—in the cipher of the German Ambassador. The key to this cipher was known, and it was regarded as too useful to be publicly divulged. That is the reason why the letter in question was not put in the portfolio (dossier).'

About the 20th of September, 1894, Colonel Sandherr, chief of the Statistical Department, communicated this letter, which he had deciphered, to General Mercier: 'Decidedly this animal Dreyfus is too exacting.' The Eclair terminated its article by a paragraph entitled 'The Proof under the Eyes of the Judges.' In this, after having stated that Dreyfus had always persisted in protesting his innocence, it added:
It is true that Dreyfus did not know, and perhaps still does not know, that the Minister of War possessed the photograph of the letter which passed between the German and Italian Military Attachés—the only document on which his name figured. The letter which he had written, and which he had taken good care not to sign, could be but a moral element in the case. In fact, if two experts in writing, Charavay and Bertillon, affirmed that it was really that of Dreyfus, the three others were undetermined. The production of the document in which Dreyfus was named was a proof which allowed no hesitation. It might determine the conviction of the tribunal; and it was of some importance that the traitor should not escape his chastisement. But this so weighty document was exceptionally confidential. It was stipulated that it should not be produced in the pleadings. It was thus communicated to the judges only in the consulting room. It being an irrefutable proof, it gave the final touch to the sentiment of the members of the court-martial. When the question was for them to pronounce on the guilt of the traitor and the punishment which should be inflicted on him, they were unanimous.

This article in the Éclair contained many other details on the manner in which Commandant du Paty de Clam had conducted his inquiry. It was a bill of indictment which, drawn up two years after the trial, could come only from the General Staff. It recounted that a strict search had been made at Dreyfus's house, in his absence—a search which was without result, and, moreover, a violation of Art. 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Why this publicity, when closed doors had been so brutally decreed by the president of the court-martial? Why was it avowed that a document had been communicated to the members of the court-martial without having been presented in the pleadings? Article 101 of the Code of Military Justice lays down that the prosecuting officer (rapporteur) must cause to be shown to the accused all the documents (pièces) which may be used for conviction, and must cross-examine the accused, so as to make him declare that he is aware of them.'

The violation of this article renders the judgment illegal. All trustworthy persons—all persons who have some notion of law—now regard the Dreyfus trial as one which calls for revision, and hold that there is every reason to believe that the condemned man has been the victim of a foul and frightful conspiracy. Two or three journals only pointed out this fact. In reply to a petition addressed to the Chamber of Deputies by Madame Dreyfus, the Chairman, M. Lorioyt, said, 'This lady, relying on an article in the Éclair, complains that neither her husband nor his counsel was called on to take cognizance of the secret documents communicated to the court-martial.' He added, 'One consideration dominates all—that is, respect for the chose jugée.'

This legislator omitted from his consideration that, if there were secret documents, the question of respect for the chose jugée does not arise, since the illegal procedure makes void the judgment of the 23rd of December, 1894, and there is no legal chose jugée to respect.

It is true that, on an interpellation of M. Castelin, an old
Boulangerist Deputy, on the 18th of November, 1896, General Billot, then Minister of War, affirmed that the deliberations of the court-martial were regular, that the case was determined (close jugée), and it was not permitted to any one to go back on the trial. The Chamber applauded this, and, by a unanimous vote less five, passed an order of the day threatening prosecution against some ill-defined and mysterious beings who have remained in obscurity and security to the present day.

But the Éclair had not only published the history of the secret document; it had also published what was said to be the text of the only document produced at the trial—the so called bordereau—on which Dreyfus had been condemned. M. Bernard Lazare, however, in his pamphlet, declared that this was not the correct text of the bordereau; and then the Matin put the matter to rest by publishing, on the 10th of February, 1896, a facsimile of the original document, which ran as follows:

THE BORDERAU

Without news indicating to me that you desire to see me, I am, however, sending to you, sir, some interesting pieces of information.

(1) A note on the hydraulic break of the 120, and the manner in which this piece conducts itself.

(2) A note on the covering troops. Some modifications will be brought about by the new plan.

(3) A note on a modification in the artillery formations.

(4) A note relating to Madagascar.

(5) The plan of firing manual for the field artillery. (14th of March, 1894.) This last document is extremely difficult to procure, and I can have it at my disposal only a very few days. The Minister of War has sent a fixed number of them among (dans) the corps, and these corps are responsible; each officer holding one must send his back after the manoeuvres. If, then, you wish to take from it that which interests you, and hold it at my disposal afterwards, I will take it, unless you wish that I should have it copied in extenso, and send you the copy.

I am about to set off for the manoeuvres.

Cool-headed people took note of the fact that, while the Éclair admitted that the experts had disagreed, and that the bordereau was not a sufficient proof of the culpability of Dreyfus, the Matin invoked it as a decisive proof.

III. ENTER SCHEURER-KESTNER AND MATHEU DREYFUS

On the 29th of October, 1897, there appeared in the Matin an article containing the following declaration of M. Scheurer-Kestner: 'I am convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus: and more than ever am I resolved to sue for his rehabilitation.'

These words of M. Scheurer-Kestner produced a profound impression. The anti-Semitic could not accuse him of being a Jew. He is a Protestant. They could not say that, if he took in hand the Dreyfus question, this was for any reason of selfish interest. He had
no need to make a noise for fame's sake. He is a rich man, beyond
the possibility of pecuniary corruption. He was vice-president of
the Senate. He had no ambition beyond this; and, as events have
proved, he could but compromise his attained position. No rational
person could suspect this Alsatian, whose patriotism is beyond
dispute, of weak indulgence for a traitor. If this man quitted the
serenity of his existence to take in hand a cause which has unchained
and let loose on him so many hatreds and furious attacks, it must be
recognised that he could not have been guided in the course he took
by any other motives than love of truth and devotion to justice.

The *Libre Parole*, the *Intransigeant*, the journals which were
first informed of the arrest of Dreyfus, and which had carried on the
campaign against General Mercier until he decided to prosecute,
burst out into insults, calumnies, and cries of indignation against
M. Scheurer-Kestner.

On the 14th of November M. Scheurer-Kestner, in a letter to the
*Temps*, said:

I have, then, affirmed my conviction, reserving to myself the communication of
its elements, in the first place, to the Government itself. It seems to be better in
all respects that the Government should have all the honour and the merit of
reparation. As early as the 30th of October, in an interview with the Minister of
War, I demonstrated, with the documents in my hands, that the *bordereau*, attribut-
ed to Captain Dreyfus, is not his, but another's. I begged him to make an
inquiry as to the real culprit. The Minister asked me, on the other hand, to noise
nothing abroad of our conversation during a fortnight, and engaged to let me know
the result of his inquiries. Since then I have waited in vain, and the fortnight
has elapsed. This is the cause of the silence which has appeared so long.

The answer of the anti-Semitic journals and the General Staff
was to put in circulation the phrase 'Dreyfus syndicate.' These two
words took, for them, the place of arguments.

In reality M. Scheurer-Kestner had, for a long time, believed in
the guilt of Dreyfus; but he felt his conviction shaken by something
which he had heard said in Alsace. In France he had only recently
come to know M. Lebois, who was born at Strasbourg, like Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Picquart, the late chief of the Information Depart-
ment. Picquart and Lebois had been friends from infancy; and, for some
months past, the latter had been in possession of the truth. This
he had told, under the seal of secrecy, to M. Scheurer-Kestner, who
was not disengaged from this pledge when he received a visit from a
person whom he had never before seen—M. Mathieu Dreyfus.

'Do you know,' said M. Mathieu Dreyfus, 'the name of the real
author of the *bordereau*?' 'Yes,' said M. Scheurer-Kestner, 'but I
am not authorised to tell it.' 'But if I tell it to you, you will not
deny it?' 'I will not.' 'Esterhazy.' 'That is indeed the name,'
replied M. Scheurer-Kestner; 'but how did you come to know it?'
'A banker, M. de Castro, bought on one of the boulevards a *fauximite*
of the *bordereau*. He recognised the writing at once as that of one
of his old customers. He compared it with letters which he had received from that person. The writing was identical; and he came to me on the 7th of November to give me this name and the proofs in support of it.

On the 15th of November M. Mathieu Dreyfus published a letter which he had addressed to the Minister of War, and which ran as follows:

The only basis of the accusation directed in 1894 against my unfortunate brother is a letter, unsigned, undated, establishing that confidential military documents had been given up to an agent of a foreign Power. I have the honour to make known to you that the author of that document is Count Walsin-Esterhazy, commandant of infantry, put on the non-active list last spring, because of temporary infirmities. The writing of Commandant Walsin-Esterhazy is identical with that of this document.

Since that name has been known information with respect to its owner has abundantly poured in; and all of it has been bad—for him. An old Pontificial Zouave, engaged during the war, and the son of a general, he rose promptly to the position of an officer; but he signalised each year of his service by acts of swindling. He wrote to an old friend, Madame de Boulancy, abominable letters, in which he dreamed of being 'captain of uhlans, sabring the French and killing a hundred thousand Frenchmen with pleasure,' and hoped to see 'Paris taken by assault and delivered up to pillage by a hundred thousand drunken soldiers.'

IV. TRIALS OF ESTERHAZY AND ZOLA

Esterhazy was tried by court-martial, with doors closed during part of the time. The hearing was public for the reading of the bill of indictment of Commandant Ravary, which had no other purpose than to excuse Esterhazy and accuse Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. The hearing was with closed doors when the latter was called upon to give evidence. It was also secret when the experts in writing, Conard, Varinard, and Belhomme, made their report. The sceptics thought that this mystery was not at all in the interest of truth. Esterhazy was unanimously acquitted, on the 11th of January. Officers pressed round him to congratulate him. One of them cried to the mob, 'Hats off, gentlemen, before the martyr of the Jews.' The self-dubbed Nationalists and the anti-Semites gave him an ovation; and, on the morrow, General de Pellieux, who was entrusted with the first examination, wrote to him as 'My dear Commandant.'

On the 13th of January Emile Zola, the celebrated novelist, who before the Dreyfus affair had always kept himself aloof from questions which excited the passions of the country, wrote a letter to the President of the Republic, in which he recalled the singular proceedings employed by Commandant du Paty de Clam in the preliminary examination of the Dreyfus trial. He showed that the chief of
the General Staff, General Mouton de Boisdeffre, the deputy-chief of the General Staff, General Gonse, Colonel Henry, who had succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Piequart as chief of the Information Department, Commandant Lauth, and General Billot, Minister of War, were all set on maintaining the condemnation of an innocent man and acquitting the real traitor, Commandant Esterhazy. This vigorous charge ended with the following sentence: ‘Finally I accuse the first court-martial of having broken the law by condemning an accused person on a document kept secret; and I accuse the second court-martial of having, by order, hushed up this illegality, by committing, in its turn, the juridical crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty person.’

M. Méline, questioned in the Chamber of Deputies by M. de Mun, the representative of the Jesuits, hastened to declare that an order had been issued for the prosecution of Émile Zola. He had not reflected that this was to send the General Staff to the Court of Assizes, and to risk the revision of the Dreyfus trial by a jury. The Government wished only to get itself out of the mess before the Chamber of Deputies. When the time of the trial came it sought to limit as much as possible the scope of the pleadings. It retained in the indictment only two or three phrases, more or less garbled, out of an article of 800 lines.

While Zola’s accusers thus wished to restrict the trial, he and his counsel, Maitre Labori, demanded that it should be given as great an amplitude as possible. The prosecution cited quite a crowd of witnesses, officers of the General Staff. They chose as judge one who thought it less his business to elicit the truth than to carry out the wishes of the Government. M. Delegorgue will remain illustrious if only for his repetition, every few minutes, of the words, ‘The question shall not be put.’ This is the way in which the General Staff and the Government understood bringing the facts of the case to light. Zola’s witnesses were interdicted from saying a word on the case of Dreyfus, if it would tend to prove his innocence; but generals and officers were allowed every latitude to assert his guilt. It was a disgraceful affair, a judicial scandal which will long remain notorious. The majority of the young advocates and the officers of reserve were against the defendant, and showed themselves proud to crowd round and cheer the generals and officers on the other side. The chief justice of the Court, M. Périvier, allowed the Palace of Justice to be invaded by bands of anti-Semites, conducted by a person named Jules Guérin, twice a bankrupt, and who, by a curious protection, had never been prosecuted for ten charges of swindling and forgery which had been made against him. Zola and his friends, as well as the jury, were day after day threatened with death. Commandants du Paty de Clam and Pauflin de St. Morel filled the Court with officers ‘to uphold the Advocate-General and the jury’ and to stifle the voice of Zola’s advocate. This is the spectacle which presented
itself during the last day of the hearing, even according to the *Echo de Paris*, one of the organs of the General Staff:

An outbreak of insults drowned the voice of the Advocate. The audience stood up; they whipped; they hooted; sticks struck the floor in regular time. On shutting one’s eyes one had the illusion that the Palace was being swallowed up by a cataclysm. Minute by minute the audience became more excited. Now it breaks out. Injurious cries increase, mixed with whistling. One by one, under the fixed looks of the assistants, the jurors quit the Court.

They would have been heroes if they had acquitted Zola under the menaces which surged around them. They condemned him without extenuating circumstances, and the Court inflicted on him the maximum penalty, a year’s imprisonment.

Zola appealed to the Court of Cassation, and that court, to the great scandal of the self-styled Nationalists and anti-Semites, annulled the decree of the Court of Assizes of the 2nd of April, because the Minister of War substituted himself as the prosecutor for the court-martial. M. Manau, the Attorney-General of the Court of Cassation, having made it understood that if the Minister of Justice laid before him a demand for the revision of the Dreyfus trial, in conformity with Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he was ready to uphold it, on the morrow, in the Chamber of Deputies, M. Méline undertook to convocate the court-martial, and declared that M. Manau ‘had used words which were to be regretted.’

The court-martial which had acquitted Esterhazy met again on the 8th of April, but good care was taken not to summon the court-martial which had condemned Dreyfus. A new prosecution of Zola was decided on, the indictment being limited to a single phrase. The first hearing took place on the 23rd of May. Zola raised a question of procedure which resulted in the adjournment of the trial. The affair came on again on the 18th of July at Versailles. Zola would have been able, at this time, to raise two questions which would have rendered the procedure null and void. These objections were beyond dispute, but he did not wish to appear anxious to avoid a hearing. He adopted another mode of procedure. He was condemned by default; and on the same evening quit the France, on the advice of friends who had, with good reason, the hope to gain time, during which they might be able to enlighten the public on matters which the Government and the Court of Assizes had decided to hush up.

V. THE MINISTRY AND COLONEL PICQUART

It is a disgraceful but an indisputable fact that the Méline Ministry had but one object in this Dreyfus case, ‘to uphold the chose jugée.’ They did not care whether Dreyfus had been properly or improperly judged. The Republican party, which called itself
Liberal and Progressive, had but one preoccupation in the matter: to stifle it. They considered it a nuisance, calculated to upset electoral calculations; and it may be safely said that the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in May last were directed against the partisans of the revision of the Dreyfus trial. There was, at that time, so much cowardice in Republican quarters that, though I considered it my duty to raise the question in my own person, I did not find, in any part of the country, a constituency which would accept and sustain me.

Jaurès, the Socialist leader, and his friend Gérault-Richard, having with great magnanimity dared to take their stand clearly, both lost their seats. Joseph Reinach also lost his. The members of the Right would willingly have demanded the suppression, for reasons of State, of all the partisans of revision; and I know Republicans who profess to be Liberals, and who were my friends a year ago, who would not have raised much objection if Jules Guérin and his band had thrown me into the Seine, with some other Dreyfusards. They did not budge when the anti-Jewish league in Algeria fomented outrages in January last; and they validated the election of M. Drumont at Algiers without demanding any measures from the Government for the protection of the Jews. These Israelites are French citizens; and they must have found a strange contradiction between the acts of a Republican Government and its device, 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.'

The Mélise Ministry was upset on the 14th of June. The Brisson Ministry succeeded it; and the 'Nationalists' and anti-Semites foisted on it M. Cavaignac as Minister of War. M. Cavaignac is a son of the general who repressed the rising of 'the days of June' in 1848, and in December was a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, in competition with Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. M. Cavaignac seems to believe that, because his father was a candidate for the Presidency, it belongs to him by hereditary right. He represents a dynasty. Eaten up by this sickly ambition, he seeks support, sometimes from the Right, sometimes from the Socialists. In July last he was the man of the 'Nationalists' and anti-Semites.

On the 7th of July there was a new interpellation by that old Boulangist M. Castelin, who considered himself as specially charged with the maintenance of the condemnation of Dreyfus. People were expecting the knock-down blow which General Billot had always promised the advocates of revision, but had never given them. M. Cavaignac said, in his speech, that 'we are masters in our own house,' a declaration which scarcely deserved the ovation it received. However, since 1894, the partisans of the condemnation of Dreyfus had never ceased to repeat, 'It is impossible to tell the whole truth. That would mean war.' M. Cavaignac destroyed this legend. He was about to tell the whole truth.
He said not a word about the bordereau—the single document on which Dreyfus was condemned. He cited two mysterious documents, one that produced by the Eclair, 'That blackguard D——,' the other a letter, two years later in date than the condemnation of Dreyfus, written by M. de Schwarzkoppen, the Military Attaché of the German Embassy, to M. Panizzardi, the Military Attaché of the Italian Embassy: 'I have read that a Deputy is about to interpellate on Dreyfus. If'—here is a part of a phrase which I cannot read—'I shall say that I never had dealings with that Jew. That is understood. If anybody asks you, say the same; for nobody must ever know what happened with him.' M. Cavaignac guaranteed 'the material and moral authenticity' of this letter; and he further cited an alleged report of Captain Lebrun-Renault, written by order three years after the condemnation of Dreyfus, and according to which Dreyfus had confessed.

The Chamber was carried away by a sort of delirium. It believed that Cavaignac had wound up the Dreyfus case. By a unanimous vote of 545 present, out of 581 Deputies, it decided on the posting up of the report of M. Cavaignac's speech all over France. As for myself, on the evening of this day of triumph I headed my article in the Siècle, 'La Révision s'impose.' For every person who could reason Cavaignac's speech was a clear demonstration that there was no evidence against Dreyfus. He said that there were a thousand documents in the Dreyfus portfolio, while Colonel Henry, the chief of the Information Department, had said, at the Assize Court, that there were but eight or nine; and of these thousand documents he could show but three? What was the value of the others?

On the 9th of July Colonel Piequat wrote to the Prime Minister:

The Minister of War having cited in the Chamber three of these documents, I consider it my duty to make known to you that I am in a position to establish before any competent jurisdiction that the two documents which bear the date of 1894 have no relevancy to Dreyfus, and that the one which bears the date of 1896 has all the characteristics of a forgery.

In answer to this, on the 12th of July a strict search was made at the house of Colonel Piequat, in his absence; and on the morrow he was arrested. This was the way in which M. Cavaignac understood his duty to throw light on the matter.

At the same time as M. Cavaignac caused Colonel Piequat to be arrested the examining magistrate Bertulus arrested Esterhazy and the woman Pays, on the plaint of Colonel Piequat himself. It was alleged that the telegrams which were sent to Piequat under the names of 'Speranza' and 'Blanche,' with a view of compromising him, were the joint work of Du Paty de Clam, Esterhazy, and the woman Pays. This was done at the time when M. Scheurer-Kestner had put himself in communication with General Billot. Day by day the Siècle publicly charged Du Paty de Clam with forgery, and
challenged him to prosecute the persons responsible for this charge; but he—a cousin of Cavaignac—has remained silent.

On the 6th of August the Chamber of Indictments released Esterhazy, the woman Pays, and Du Paty de Clam; but on the 1st of September the Court of Cassation, the Supreme Court, declared that the Chamber of Indictments had violated the law; and on the same day the public learnt, from the decree of M. Bertalas, the relations which existed between Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, Commandant Esterhazy, and the woman Pays. But before this, on the 30th of August, an announcement was made which was of first-rate importance. In the evening the *Agence Havas* sent round to the journals the news that Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, chief of the Information Department, had confessed that the document produced by Generals de Pellieux and de Boisdeffre at the Assize Court, and read by M. Cavaignac in the Chamber of Deputies—"that never have I had relations with that Jew"—was a forgery, fabricated by him. His arrest was made known at the same time. He was taken to Mont Valérien, while the military prison is situated in the Rue du Cherche-Midi.

VI. THE FORGERS AT THE WAR OFFICE

It was commonly talked about at that time that Cavaignac knew of the forgery so far back as the 13th of August. The Italian Ambassador, Signor Tornielli, had energetically protested against the forgery from the month of October 1897, when it first came to his knowledge, to the 17th of February, when General de Pellieux made use of it; and his protests were, no doubt, redoubled in energy after the speech of M. Cavaignac, who charged Captain Cuignet with the verification of the documents in the portfolio, without doubt for the purpose of fortifying his arguments. Now Captain Cuignet found out the forgery by discovering that the paper was not the same. However, M. Cavaignac maintained silence on the matter. But on the 25th of August Esterhazy appeared before the court of inquiry, and attended a second sitting of the court on the 27th.

Furious at being abandoned by the General Staff—he who boasted, 'I am the General Staff’s man'—Esterhazy entered on the path of revelations. He spoke of forgeries committed by Henry and Du Paty de Clam. To save the latter and the other officers Cavaignac sacrificed Henry. In the report presented to the Court of Cassation the cross-examination of Henry by Cavaignac breaks off brusquely after the confession of Henry. It is very unlikely that the curiosity of the Minister of War stopped at this point. Instead of sending Henry to the military prison of Cherche-Midi, he sent him to the fort of Montj Valérien. This is proof that the Minister, forced to acknowledge the forgery, still did not treat Henry as an ordinary
criminal. More evidence of this was forthcoming on the evening of the next day, when Henry's suicide was announced. Nobody believed that it was by inadvertence that his razor had been left to him. People regarded his death as facilitated, if not suggested to him. They coupled this death with that of an obscure agent named Lemercier-Piquart, who was found hanged to the fastening of a window of a lodging house in February last. This poor wretch was a likely person to have been used in the execution of the forgery. Many people felt convinced that there had been no real suicide in either of these cases, but that both of these men had been murdered. And the Government had done all it could to strengthen this hypothesis; for there was no public report of the death of Henry and no post mortem examination of his body. What would be said of such a case in England, were the coroner's inquest suppressed?

The emotion caused in France by these events was profound; but the Petiot Journal, the Liberté Parole, the Intransigeant, and the other 'Nationalist' and anti-Semitic journals none the less continued to affirm the culpability of Dreyfus. A writer of the Gazette de France, M. Charles Maurras, proposed to raise a statue to the 'forger through patriotism.' Henry was represented as a hero who, rather than deliver up secret documents which would have compromised the national defence, had preferred to commit forgery. The subscription for the statue was not, however, a success, but in December the Liberté Parole had opened subscriptions for his widow and his son. Still M. Cavaignac, by a strange paradox, continued to affirm that this forgery of Henry had but confirmed his conviction of the guilt of Dreyfus; and, as the Brisson Ministry considered that this discovery made it their duty to commence the process of revision, by nominating the Commission provided for in Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, M. Cavaignac at once resigned.

Still he had proved, by his speech of the 7th of July, that the forgery which had been discovered was, perhaps, not the only one. He said that 'the moral authenticity of this document follows from the exchanged correspondence—the first written and the other which replies to it.' Now, if M. Cavaignac's argument is worth anything, it goes to show that, now the letter in question has proved to be a forgery, the other correspondence with which it fits in should suffer discredit with it. Moreover Henry's action shows that there was no sufficient evidence against Dreyfus. If there had been such evidence Colonel Henry would not have been obliged to concoct a forgery two years after the condemnation of Dreyfus, in order to prove his guilt. At the same time as Henry's forgery was discovered the inquiry instituted by M. Bertinclus proved that Du Paty de Clam had fabricated false telegrams, signed 'Blanche' and 'Speranza,' addressed to Colonel Piquart in 1897, and had forged a letter which he afterwards caused to be seized in the post, in order to compromise Piquart.

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Here are, then, at least two officers at the General Staff who are forgers. Why may there not be others? What has been the part played by Generals de Boisdeffre, Gonse, and de Pellieux, who made use of these forgeries? Were they dupes or accomplices? And what was the part taken by Commandant Lauth, and Gribelin the Keeper of the Records?

VII. MILITARY MANOEUVRES

The Brisson Ministry replaced M. Cavaignac by General Zurlinden, Military Governor of Paris. The latter knew, at the time he entered the Cabinet, that revision was a decided matter. However two or three days afterwards, following close upon some conferences with officers and priests, he completely changed his opinion. When asked by his colleagues for the reason for this change he could give no rational account of it; but he quitted the Ministry by declaring, in an insolent letter, that he was more than ever convinced of the guilt of Dreyfus. The Government was so weak as to reinstate him as Governor of Paris. General Chanoine, who succeeded him, thought fit to play the same rôle. All at once, on the 25th of October, the first day of the session of the Chamber of Deputies, he passed over to the side of the ‘Nationalists’ and anti-Semites, and brought about the fall of the Ministry. It was not a very creditable manœuvre. If Generals Zurlinden and Chanoine think that, by such proceedings, they raise the prestige of the uniform they wear, they are mistaken.

While these tactics were pursued within the Ministry there was a military plot hatching without; for, in the terms of Article 89 of the Penal Code, ‘there is a conspiracy when the resolution to act is concocted and decreed between two or more persons.’ General Zurlinden gave in his resignation on the 17th of September. Now, on that very day M. Cavaignac hired a room at the Hôtel du Louvre. General Zurlinden went to lunch and dine with him in a private room. During the whole day officers in private dress were coming and going. General Zurlinden kept in touch with M. Deroulède, who had insolently reconstituted his so called ‘League of Patriots,’ dissolved by decree in 1887. A strike of navvies broke out, and troops were collected from all parts of France, ostensibly because of this strike. Bands of ‘Nationalists’ and anti-Semites scoured the streets of Paris. Generals who felt themselves compromised kept a sharp look-out for any overt act. The danger was that the ‘Nationalist’ bands might engage a few agents provocateurs to stir up a conflict with the soldiery. This they dared not to do. The generals were disarmed by the thought of the responsibilities of the morrow, home and foreign. From the moment when they let pass their opportunity—from the 7th to the 15th of October—with one of their own men as Minister of War, General Zurlinden Governor of
Paris, General Renouart chief of the General Staff, General Roget at the head of the War Office, General de Pellieux Commandant of Paris—one might be without fear. Without a doubt many dream still of a decisive military blow which is to be struck in some miraculous fashion; but nobody is disposed to attempt it.

Notwithstanding all this plotting the Brisson Ministry had, on the 26th of September, laid before the Court of Cassation the demand for revision. The 'Nationalist' and anti-Semitic journals threatened, and menaces of military violence were heard on all sides, but the judges of the Criminal Chamber did their duty. They devoted the hearing on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of October to the remarkable report of M. Bard and the speech of the Attorney-General, Manau, an old Republican and ex-outlaw of the 2nd of December, 1851. Revision was certain. Efforts were made to induce the judges of the Court of Cassation to grant this without inquiry, and send Dreyfus before another court martial. That was a trap in which the Court of Cassation showed no disposition to let itself be caught. It desired that this odious and terrible affair should be completely cleared up. The Court declared the demand for revision admissible, and that it would itself undertake the inquiry. Revision is now only a question of weeks; and, in all probability, the Court, by virtue of Article 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, will annul the judgment of 1894, condemning Dreyfus, without sending him before a new court martial. We may depend that the powers of the Supreme Court will be loyally and effectually used. And it is well that this is so. If revision had taken place a few months ago, it would but have given rise to another crime. Colonel Bougon was one of the judges of the court martial which tried Dreyfus, and he comforted himself with the cynical remark, 'Revision is an affair of two boats, one to bring Dreyfus home and the other to take him back again.'

VIII. THE INNOCENCE OF DREYFUS

From the very moment when Dreyfus was condemned I thought there were grave doubts as to his guilt. The means employed two years afterwards to procure his condemnation a second time, by the Chamber of Deputies, augmented my doubts. When Schenrur-Kestner spoke, when one could compare the bordereau with Esterhazy's writing, my conviction of the innocence of Dreyfus became much stronger. But when, at the end of December 1897, I became acquainted with the contents of the bill of indictment, which I published in the Siècle of the 7th of January, 1898, I felt certain of Dreyfus's innocence. If those who were intent on the ruin of Dreyfus had other proofs than the bordereau they would not have been content with arguments so empty and ridiculous as these products of M. d'Ormescheville. From the point of view of the
handwriting he was obliged to avow that, out of five experts, two had not recognised the similitude. He allowed that the strict search which had been made had been without result, and that, in the cross-examination of Dreyfus, each time the latter was pressed hard 'he extricated himself without difficulty.' It is true that Commandant d'Ormescheville added, 'thanks to his flexibility of mind.' That was his mode of interpreting all Dreyfus's acts. He said that 'the private life of Dreyfus was far from being exemplary;' and he recounted two or three tales of vulgar adventures with the other sex. He accused him of having been a witness in the case of Madame Dida, who had been murdered. When the bill of indictment was published, Dr. Lutaud, who had been the medical attendant of that lady, drew attention to the fact that the judge of the Assize Court had congratulated Dreyfus on the delicacy of his conduct. The report said, 'Dreyfus never had a taste for gambling;' but it insinuated that, as he dined once at the Press Club, he was not beyond suspicion.

M. d'Ormescheville affirmed that he often paid secret visits to Alsace. When the bill of indictment became public the Strassburger Post stated that, on the contrary, he had been refused permission to stay there. It was pretended that the bordereau could not have been written save by a captain of artillery; and when mention was made of the piece of 120 it was explained that the bordereau employs expressions foreign to the habitual vocabulary of the artillery. It was said in the bordereau, 'Je vais partir en manœuvres;' and Dreyfus did not go aux manœuvres.

From Dreyfus's knowledge of German it was concluded that he was intended to be a spy. As regards the alleged similarity of the handwriting of the bordereau to that of Dreyfus, out of five experts two, Messieurs Gobert and Pelletier, have always maintained that no such similarity exists. A madman, M. Adolphe Bertillon,¹ and M. Teyssonnières, a gentleman whose name had been struck out of the list of exports of the Tribunal of the Seine, pronounced for identity. A third, M. Charavay, while joining in this opinion, had some reservations. When the Esterhazy trial took place the three experts Varinard, Couard, and Belhomme, who made themselves remarked at the Zola trial by their strange attitude, gave their opinion that the writing of the bordereau had been traced from that of Esterhazy. How likely it is that Dreyfus did this, when he did not say in his defence, 'This writing is not mine; it is that of Esterhazy,' and never once pronounced Esterhazy's name!

Out of eight experts it will be seen that five declared that the writing of the bordereau was not that of Dreyfus or that it was traced from that of Esterhazy. Now if it had been traced from

¹ He must not be confounded with his brother, M. Jacques Bertillon, Director of Municipal Statistics of Paris.
Esterhazy’s writing the three experts who said it was Dreyfus’s writing were wrong. The experts Bertillon, Couard, Varinard, and Belhomme refused to give their reasons, while M. Paul Meyer, Director of the Ecole des Chartes, M. Giry, Professor at the Ecole des Chartes, and M. Louis Havet, Professor at the Collège de France, gave theirs.

In one of the copies of letters addressed to a ‘general’—supposed to be General de Pellieux—which the magistrate Bertulus found in making search in the house of the woman Pays, Esterhazy says, ‘If you are not sure of the experts, I will say that my writing has been traced.’ In fact, that was his plan of defence. Moreover in the searches made by order of the Court of Cassation, letters of Esterhazy have been found which are not only in the same handwriting as that of the bordereau, but written at the same period, on the same thin bank post, on paper belonging to the same cuvée and of very exceptional quality. And, to cap all, Esterhazy has himself avowed since that he wrote the bordereau, but by order of the General Staff. We believe that here, as usual, he was telling a lie.

In reality Esterhazy has been a professional spy. He himself has acknowledged that he had relations with Colonel von Schwarzkoppen, the German Military Attaché. The ‘Narrative of a Diplomatist’ in the Siécle of the 4th of April, and the conversation of M. Casella with Colonel von Schwarzkoppen, published by the same journal on the 8th of April, give circumstantial information as to these relations. These statements, far from being denied, have been confirmed in various directions. Esterhazy was the purveyor in ordinary of secret documents to Colonel von Schwarzkoppen, who received from first to last not less than 162 such documents; he was purveyor up to the 10th of November, 1896, the date of the publication of the facsimile in the Matin. Colonel von Schwarzkoppen was then shocked to discover that the bordereau was written by Esterhazy, who had not dared to continue his relations with him, but returned, revolver in hand, on the 16th of October, 1897, to demand that Colonel von Schwarzkoppen should go to Madame Dreyfus and tell her that her husband had been in communication with him. Colonel von Schwarzkoppen was recalled to Berlin before the name of Esterhazy was pronounced in connection with the Dreyfus case. In his conversations with M. Henri Casella he declared in the most unqualified manner that Dreyfus is not guilty. Respecting Esterhazy he said, ‘He is capable of anything.’

Moreover Herr von Bilow made a clear declaration, so far back as the 24th of January, 1898, at the Budget Commission of the Reichstag, ‘that there had never existed any relations or acquaintance between Dreyfus and any German agency whatever;’ and, on the 21st of January, the same declaration was made for Italy by the
Count of Bonin Longare, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

There is, then, no longer any doubt for any one who has studied the affair even a little. There is an innocent man, Dreyfus; and a spy, Esterhazy, who probably had for his accomplice the very chief of the Information Department, Colonel Henry. These two worthies were in communication at least since 1880; and, according to Esterhazy's letters, written in 1893 and seized at the house of M. Jules Roche, Henry was his debtor. The court martial of 1894 condemned a guiltless man; the court martial of 1898 acquitted the guilty one; and the officers of the General Staff, the majority of the generals, have staked the honour of the army on this doubly disgraceful delinquency. As if this were not enough, they have added to it a third which is still more odious than its predecessors.

IX. THE REVENGE OF THE CULPRITS

The Information Department is of recent creation. It had for its first chief a Colonel Vincent, who finished his career somewhat badly. Colonel Sandherr, who followed him, was struck down by general paralysis; but, before that happened, he was affected with anti-Semitism in its most acute form. It was while he was at the head of this service that Dreyfus was prosecuted and condemned. His successor was Commandant Picquet, of Alsatian origin and of a very Catholic family. He had followed the Dreyfus trial as a delegate of General Mercier. He had no prepossession in favour of Dreyfus. Being thus brought to examine Dreyfus's portfolio (dossier), he found in it only absurd or insignificant documents. In 1896 the same agent who had sent the bordereau brought a pneumatic telegram, torn into sixty pieces. This telegram card figures as one of the leading documents of the case, under the name of the ‘petit bleu.’ This telegram, which came from Colonel von Schwarzkoppen, runs thus:—

I am awaiting, above all, a more detailed explanation than that which you gave to me the other day on the pending question. In consequence, I beg of you to give it to me in writing, so that I may be able to judge if I can continue my relations with the house R. or not.

M. le Commandant Esterhazy,
27 Rue de la Bienfaisance,
Paris.

This little paper, if it had been seized in the post or at Esterhazy's house, would have been insignificant. That which constituted its value was that it had the same origin as the bordereau. It was not evidence in itself. It was a hand which pointed out to Colonel Picquet the direction in which to make inquiry.

An agent declared that 'a superior officer, aged about fifty years,
furnished a foreign Power with such or such documents.' 'Now these documents,' said Colonel Picquet, 'are precisely those of which the comrade spoke to me, to whom I addressed myself when I received the card telegram.' Colonel Picquet asked the colonel of the regiment in which Esterhazy served to furnish him with certain letters. These he compared with the bordereau and placed them under the eyes of M. Bertillon, who said to Colonel Picquet, almost as soon as he had seen them, 'It is the handwriting of the bordereau!'

Colonel Picquet made this inquiry with the authorisation of General Gonse, deputy chief of the General Staff; but it was on the eve of the Castellin interpellation, in the month of November 1896, and Generals Gonse and de Boisdeffre perceived that the guilt of Esterhazy involved the innocence of that Jew Dreyfus and the revision of the trial of 1894. So, on the 16th of November, after giving Picquet a vague State mission, they sent him to Algeria and thence to Tunis, where he received his nomination as lieutenant-colonel of sharpshooters. There, the two generals advised General Leclerc, Governor of Tunis, that he should employ Picquet on the Tripoli border in seeking out the place where Morès had been assassinated. General Leclerc was not willing to take the responsibility of this murder. It was at this time that Picquet confided what he had found out to M. Leblois, an ex-Attorney-General. That Picquet was well aware of the nature of his mission is shown by the fact that he said to M. Leblois, 'I will not carry this secret to my grave.'

This took place in the month of June 1897. M. Leblois put himself in communication with M. Scheurer-Kestner, and was able to complete the inquiry made by him.

When General de Pellieux made inquiry concerning Esterhazy, neither he nor the Minister of War wished to recall Picquet from Tunis. They avoided his deposition so long as they could; but when General de Pellieux was obliged to resign himself to it, he made a strict search at the witness Picquet's domicile, while Esterhazy, the accused, was allowed to make himself quite easy about any search at his house. The so-called bill of indictment against Esterhazy was really a bill of indictment against Picquet. The generals, the prosecuting counsel, the Government Commissioner, the judges of the court martial, all regarded Picquet as the traitor. He had dared to discover the real culprit, whose guilt implied the innocence of Dreyfus. How could a man like Picquet, a Catholic, the youngest lieutenant-colonel in the French army, having the most brilliant future before him, sacrifice all in order to take up the defence of this convicted Jew? With a ferocious frankness General Gonse said to him, 'If you say nothing nobody will know anything.' What a frightful moral and mental state does not this reveal on the part of
some of the most prominent chiefs of the French army! They could not pardon Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart for offering himself up on the altar of justice, in order to save an unknown man from torture and injustice.

Soon after the trial of Esterhazy Picquart was put under arrest in the fort of Mont Valérien. He was there during the Zola trial. He was held under the threat of a renewal of the court of inquiry. This is what we may call the policy of blackmail—"If you are discreetly silent we may be indulgent towards you." Picquart declined this bargain. He said what he knew, amid the insults of his chiefs and his old subordinates. General de Pellieux sneered at him as 'this gentleman.' Colonel Henry, the forger, said to him, 'You have lied about it;' and the judge Delegorgue, instead of reprimanding this insult to a witness, interjected the farcical remark, 'I see you are not in accord.' Commandant Lauth accused him of having desired to make him get the 'petit bleu' stamped for the post. Soon after the Zola trial Picquart appeared before a court of inquiry. He was accused of having communicated the Boullot portfolio to M. Leblois. Boullot was an agent of espionage who had been condemned for having carried off plans of fortresses to a photographer; and the fact was that Picquart had communicated the matter to his friend Leblois, in the interest of the service, in order to obtain juridical information. He was reproached with having communicated the portfolio on carrier pigeons. Picquart had really asked Leblois for advice in the codification of divers circulars concerning those pigeons. Henry and Gribelin said they had seen on his desk, sticking out of an envelope, the secret document which the Éclair had published in 1896, 'That blackguard D——,' at the same time as M. Leblois happened to be in Picquart's office; but M. Leblois proved that he was not in Paris at that time. Picquart was put en réforme—that is to say that, while keeping his title of lieutenant-colonel, he ceased to form part of the army.

If Picquart had striven to be selfishly prudent things might have rested at this point; but he, having written to M. Brisson, on the 9th of July, after Cavaignac's speech, that he proposed to show that of the three documents produced by Cavaignac two had no relation to the affair, and the third was a forgery, a search was made at his house and then he was arrested. They tried to prosecute him and M. Leblois before the Correctional Police. That tribunal delivered judgment on the 28th of October. It declared his case connected with that of the revision of the Dreyfus trial, and deferred any conclusion sine dix. Then, notwithstanding the advice of the Cabinet, General Zurlinden apprehended him, shut him up au secret in the military prison of Cherche-Midi, and turned him over to a Captain Tavernier, belonging to a clerical family at Aix, who had been brought expressly from Marsilles for this job. Picquart was kept in solitary confine-
ment for three weeks, without being examined. They commenced by depriving him of his liberty, and looked into his case afterwards. General Zurlinden knew that the Ministry was opposed to this prosecution. He went further, and the Ministry had the weakness not to dismiss him. And they went on in this same feeble way. General Zurlinden chose the members of the court martial and fixed the 12th of December as the day on which Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart should appear before it. Messieurs Millerand and Ribot demanded in the Chamber of Deputies, on the 28th of November, that the Government should use its rights to suspend this trial till after the revision of the Dreyfus case; and M. Monis did the same in the Senate on the following day. Messieurs Charles Dupuy and de Freycinet refused to interfere, though it is quite evident that this trial of Picquart is a mere act of revenge. Hope, however, rests with the Court of Cassation.

Not only are charges made against Picquart in the matter already named, but it is pretended that he forged the ‘petit bien.’ His accusers desire to take revenge for Henry by a _tu quoque_. They want to be able to say, ‘Ah! if we have a forger among us so have you.’ And in order to convict Picquart they have among them some one who would complete Henry’s forgery by another. Esterhazy’s name has been roughly erased and rewritten on the envelope in order to make it appear that the address is a fraud. But with their habitual clumsiness they have not submitted the address to the same operation, so that in order to prove their thesis they would have to establish that Colonel von Schwarzkoppen had another correspondent in the house in which Esterhazy lived. And General Zurlinden marches off, repeating, ‘It is neither Dreyfus nor Esterhazy who is the traitor; it is Colonel Picquart. He shall go to prison!’

The real culprits hoped at least to have the satisfaction of getting Picquart condemned to some years of imprisonment by the court martial convoked for the 12th of December; but Picquart ended by yielding to the advice of his friends, and decided to lay before the Court of Cassation a request for a ruling on the part of the judges. On the 8th of December the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in virtue of Article 526 and the following articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure, claimed to be put in possession of the Picquart portfolio. This involved a compulsory adjournment of the court martial _sine die_—an adjournment which will certainly extend till after the revision of the Dreyfus trial; and, according to a decision of 1857, the Court of Cassation will have the right to declare that there is no need to send Picquart back before any other tribunal.

People noticed, on the 8th of December, the manner in which General Zurlinden spoke of ‘the person named Picquart,’ accused of having committed ‘a forgery in order to compromise Monsieur le
Commandant Esterhazy—as if that typical scoundrel’s own writings, own words, and own acts were not sufficient to compromise him! And people noticed, at the same time, that M. Athalin, the judge who was deputed to report on the case—who had heard the depositions of the five Ministers of War, of M. Bertius, the examining magistrate, and of Colonel Piequart himself—used very different language. He gave a luminous opinion and spoke of the important seizure of an expert opinion on a letter by Esterhazy, dated the 17th of August 1894, written on an extremely rare kind of paper, of the same batch in manufacture as that of the bordereau.

Piequart thus escapes a condemnation which would have provoked a new revision; but he has been kept in prison for months. The men of the General Staff and the great army chiefs seem to think that this is so much gained.

X. MEN OF INTELLECT AND MEN OF AUTHORITY

This conspiracy against Piequart, more criminal still than that which obtained the condemnation of Dreyfus and the acquittal of Esterhazy, caused a movement of profound indignation. As early as the month of January men who habitually kept aloof from public affairs, and who by character were averse to a noisy struggle, were seen coming out of their studies and laboratories to protest against the contempt of truth and right. Chemists like Ducaux, Friedel, Grimaux; scholars like Paul Meyer, the Director of the Ecole des Chartes, Giry, Louis Havet, Paul Viollet; writers like Anatole France, joined in this solemn expostulation. All the students of the Ecole Normale Supérieure without hesitation added their voices to this chorus of deprecation, though they knew that by doing so they would compromise their future prospects. These devotees of justice were called, in derision, ‘the men of intellect;’ and, in an article in the Revue des Deux Mondes of the 15th of March, M. Brunetiére assured them of his entire contempt. Neither threats and denunciations, nor the measures taken by the Government against some of them, discouraged them. Grimaux, Professor of Chemistry at the Ecole Polytechnique, was pensioned off before his time; M. Paul Stapfer, the Dean of the Faculty of Letters of Bordeaux, was suspended for six months; but the voice of protest became louder and firmer with the prosecution of Piequart. It may be said that, in the revision of the Dreyfus trial, it is the intellectual élite of France which has conquered, with the aid of the highest organised expression of justice in France, the Court of Cassation.

This intellectual élite had against it the prejudices of race and religion, reanimated, during the last fifteen years, by the anti-Semitic campaign planned by M. Edouard Drumont under the direction of the Jesuits. Moreover it had against it the General Staff, the
majority of the generals and officers, and the soldiers who were not allowed to read any other journals than the *Petit Journal*, the *Liber Pauvre*, and other papers of this kind. It had against it the clergy. All the clerical journals evinced towards Dreyfus and his defenders a most savage ferocity, and not a prelate has said a word in favour of justice or even of mercy or pity. It had against it the cowardice of the majority of politicians, who feared lest their patriotism might be suspected if they admitted that a court martial had condemned an innocent man. It had against it all the statesmen who believed that their honour was bound up with ignorance of the Dreyfus case. M. Brisson, Prime Minister, and M. Sarrien, Minister of Justice, did not read the report of the trial of Zola till after Henry's death. It had against it the multitude which still is ignorant of the greater part of the details of the Dreyfus affair, because the ordinary journals have never ceased to hide them or distort them. It had against it a number of people, from the President of the Republic, who thought the revision of the judgment of a court martial was unconstitutional, to the meanest vestry-keeper. And still it has conquered!

Still this affair proves how difficult it is for Catholic peoples to adopt themselves to liberal institutions. They have always to struggle against the alliance of the clergy and the army, against the conspiracy of Basile and Ratapoil. The Dreyfus affair is a sequel to Boulangism. We find among the opponents of revision most of the Boulangist leaders, including Rochefort, Drumont, Deroulède, and Millevoye, and among its partisans the majority of those who combated Boulangism. In all these intrigues and machinations, learnedly and patiently prepared, we find, *flagrante delicto*, the Jesuits. Their pupils constitute in the army and navy a society apart, designed to favour its affiliated members, to persecute those who are independent of it, and to mould the military power which is theirs so that it shall become, one day, the sole and supreme power of the land.

The Jesuits tried to eliminate the Jews from the army with the Crémieux-Foa affair, at the commencement of 1894. They threw themselves into the Dreyfus affair as a much wished for opportunity. And they have attained their end in a measure; for many Jews, officers in the army, have quitted it, and young men who were in preparation for the army have renounced the idea of entering such a hornets' nest. The Jesuits feel that the revision of the Dreyfus trial will be a terrible rout for them and their projects. Hence the wildness of their passion. This affair has unveiled for us a latent evil the gravity of which we were far from suspecting. It has taught us a frightful lesson on the mental and moral condition of our generals. I hope we shall have the vigour and persistence necessary in order to fortify the independence of our judiciary, to modify in thorough fashion the
organisation of military justice, and, while guaranteeing freedom of association, to defend ourselves against men who, in their plotting against all liberal institutions, do not hesitate to sanction crimes like those which the Dreyfus affair has revealed to us. At first we thought only of a judicial error. Now we have found confessed forgers like Henry and Du Paty de Clam among the officers of the General Staff; persons who have no revulsion from any means to save Esterhazy and keep Dreyfus at the Devil's Island; and shameless accomplices or voluntary dupes among the Ministers of War, the chiefs and deputy chiefs of the General Staff, and the Generals Commandant of Paris.

Yves Guyot,
Ex-Minister of Public Works.

The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake to return unaccepted MSS.